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"IT'S MY PARTY AND I'LL CRY IF I WANT TO": STATE
INTRUSIONS UPON THE ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOMS
OF POLITICAL PARTIES-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
THE UNITED STATES V. WISCONSIN EX REL. LA
FOLLETTE
In 1897, shortly before he became governor of Wisconsin, Robert M. La Follette Sr. urged a University of Chicago audience to
"[G]o back to the first principle of democracy. Go back to the people.
Substitute for both the caucus and convention a primary election . ..

where the citizen may cast his vote directly .

.

. and

have it canvassed and returned just as he cast it."' As a result of La
Follette's efforts, direct primary legislation was passed by the Wisconsin legislature in 1903, approved by popular referendum in 1904,
and thereupon became law.2 In 1979, Wisconsin Attorney General
Bronson La Follette filed a petition on behalf of the State of Wisconsin seeking to enjoin the National Democratic Party (National
Party) from taking action that he believed threatened the vitality of
the direct primary law his grandfather had brought into being seventy-five years earlier. In 1981, DemocraticPartyof the United States
v. Wisconsin ex. rel. La Follette3 (La Follette) came before the
Supreme Court of the United States.
This Note will first relate the events that led to the confrontation in La Follette between the State of Wisconsin and the National
Party. After a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion, La Follette
will be compared with other cases that balanced the interests of
state and party. It will be suggested, however, that evaluating La
Follette and related cases solely in terms of a traditional balancing of
interests test is of limited utility in understanding why the case was
decided as it was. An alternative analytical approach will then be
proposed which, in conjunction with a balancing of interests test,
more satisfactorily explains the La Follette decision and what it
portends.
1.

Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 23, 1897, at 2, col. 4 (reprinted in A. LovEJoy, LA FoL-

LETTE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY IN WISCONSIN 36 (1941)).

2. 1905 Wis. Laws ch. 369. The proposal was formally called "The Primary Election
Bill of 1903," No. 97A. A. LOVEJOY, supra note 1, at 7. It was supported by popular referendum, 130,699 (61.9%) to 80,192 (38.1%). Id. at 90-91.
3. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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I. BACKGROUND

Under Wisconsin statutes governing primary elections, voting
in a particular party's primary is not limited to members of that
party, but rather is open to all eligible voters regardless of party

affiliation. 4 After the primary is held, delegates to the party's national convention are seledted at state caucuses which are "closed",
that is, composed entirely of persons publicly declaring their affilia-

tion with the party. Wisconsin law, however, requires those delegates to pledge to vote at the convention in accord with the results of
the open primary.5
The importance of the open primary law to the State of Wisconsin is best understood by placing its development in an historical
context. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was

amid the "progressive era". Intellectual and political thought, as
well as the art and literature of the period reflect the basic themes of
progressivism: dismay over the rapid expansion of big business and
the resulting emergence of a powerful and privileged business elite,

concern for the plight of an increasingly visible and vast urban poor,
and disgust with a government perceived to be ruled by political
4. WIS. STAT. § 5.37(4) (1979) provides in part: "Voting machines may be used at primary elections when they comply with . . . the following provisions:. . . the elector may
secretly select the party for which he or she wishes to vote ....
WIs. STAT. § 10.02 (1979) provides in part:
Voting instructions shall be given as follows: (a) Upon being permitted to vote, the
elector shall retire, alone to a voting booth or machine and cast his or her ballot . . . (b) At the presidential preference primary . . ., the elector shall select the
party ballot of his or her choice . . . (f) After an official paper ballot is marked, it
shall be folded so the inside marks do not show.
In La Follette, the United States Supreme Court accepted the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's observation that "What characterizes the Wisconsin primary as 'open' is that the
voter is not required to declare publicly a party preference or to have that preference publicly
... La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 111 (1981), quoting from State ex rel. La Follette v.
recorded.
Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 485, 287 N.W.2d 519, 523 (1980).
5. WIs. STAT. § 8.12(3)(C)5 (1979) provides in part:
5. If the delegate or alternate is selected to represent votes cast for a specific
candidate for the office of president of the United States . . . in accordance with the
method of selection used by the party under par. (a), or is selected to replace such a
person, a pledge in the following form:
"As a delegate to the 19_ national convention of the - party I pledge myself to support the candidacy of _ as a candidate for the nomination for president
by the _ party; that I will, unless prevented by death of the candidate, vote for his
(or her) candidacy on the first ballot; and vote for his (or her) candidacy on any
additional ballot, unless released by said candidate, until said candidate fails to receive at least one-third of the votes authorized to be cast; and that, thereafter, I shall
have the right to cast my convention vote according to my own judgment."
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bosses and unresponsive to the needs of the American people. 6 To
progressive politicians, the basic objective was to effect reform that
would wrest control of the government from political bosses and the
business elite, and return it permanently to the hands of the people.
While the impact of progressive reform was felt in every state of the
union, few states were as profoundly influenced as Wisconsin.'
Historians have characterized Wisconsin as the "showcase" of
progressivism,I noting primarily the work of Robert M. La Follette,
who is commonly credited with initiating progressive reform at the
state level. 9 Of the many measures passed at La Follette's instigation during his three terms as governor between 1900-1906, the direct primary law was regarded by him, and is viewed by historians,
as among the most significant.' 0 The party caucus system of delegate selection provided no meaningful opportunity for the public to
participate in deciding who would be nominated to represent the
party at the general election and was, in La Follette's view, hopelessly corrupted by political bossism. I' By contrast, a direct primary would further the progressives' goal of returning the control of
the government to the electorate by assuring each voter an equal say
in the selection of the party's nominee.
The direct primary procedure became law in Wisconsin in 1904;
by 1917 all but four states had followed suit with similar legislation.' 2 Unlike the other states, however, Wisconsin provided for an
open direct primary. 3 The open feature of the primary law was supported on the ground that it might well be unconstitutional to disenfranchise independent voters by permitting only those with preex6. C. DEGLER, T. COCHRAN, V. DESANTIS, H. HAMILTON, W. HARBAUGH, A. LINK, R.
NYE, D. POTTER & C. VERSTEEG, THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 352-73 (1973); J. BLUM, B.
CATTON, E. MORGAN, A. SCHLESSINGER, K. SLAMP & C.V. WOODWARD, THE NATIONAL ExPE-

RIENCE 539-47 (1968) [hereinafter cited as J. BLUM).
7. J. BLUM, supra note 6, at 545-46.
8.
H. MARGUILES, THE DECLINE OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN WISCONSIN v
(1968).
9. J. BLUM, supra note 6, at 545: E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 130-31

(1956).
10. R. LA FOLLETTE, LA FOLLETTE'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 292 (1913); A. LOvEJoY, supra
note 1, at 8; E. GOLDMAN, supra note 9, at 132.
11. R. LA FOLLETTE, supra note 10, at 195-96.
12. W. KEECH & D. MATTHEWS, THE PARTY'S CHOICE 91-92 (1976).
13. Montana was the only other state mandating an open direct primary. B. FORD, THE
WISCONSIN PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARY: OPEN OR CLOSED? WISCONSIN LEGISLA-

TIVE REFERENCE BUREAU RESEARCH BULLETIN 75-RM-15 (1975) (on file at the Wisconsin

Law Review). It is interesting to note that La Follette appeared to be relatively unconcerned
about whether the primary was open or closed. He was no less enthusiastic about an earlier
draft of the direct primary law that provided for a closed primary, than he was about the open
primary bill ultimately adopted. Id. at 6.
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isting party affiliations to participate; by keeping the primary
"open", voter participation would be encouraged and the secrecy of
the voters' choices preserved.14
In 1911, Wisconsin extended the application of its open direct
primary procedure to the selection of presidential candidates.' 5 Except for minor revisions, the law assumed its present form in 1949
when it was amended to require that party delegates pledge to vote
at their conventions in accord with open primary results.' 6
The progressive origins of the open primary account for its
present day significance to the State of Wisconsin. The law reflects
the state's interest in protecting the primacy of the individual voter
over political machines, bosses and parties.' As one scholar has
observed:
To many Wisconsin citizens, it would seem undemocratic to be asked to
identify publicly with a party as prerequisite for primary voting, and to
restrict oneself in advance to a given party's ballot would seem a foolish
perdeprivation of the opportunity
8 to vote for (or against) an important
sonality on another ticket. 1

From 1949 to 1968, without objection from either major political party, Wisconsin sent delegates to national political party conventions bound by a pledge to vote in accord with the state's open
primary results. Shortly after the National Democratic Convention
of 1968, however, the National Democratic Committee established
the McGovern/Fraser Commission to study and assess the Democratic Party's nominating procedure and internal structure.' 9 The
Commission concluded, among other things, that effective participation by Democrats in the delegate selection process was hampered
to the extent non-Democrats were allowed to participate and
thereby dilute the significance of the Democrats' preferences. 20 The
National Democratic Committee organized a second commission in
1972, which came to a similar conclusion. 2 1 In 1975, a third commission echoed the findings of its two predecessors 2 2 and, relying in part
on an independent study of crossover voting in Wisconsin's open pri14.
15.
16.

Id. at 7; Milwaukee Sentinel, Mar. 1, 1901, at 4, col. 2.

17.
18.

S. SCHIER, THE RULES AND THE GAME 37 (1980).
L. EPSTEIN, POLITICS IN WISCONSIN 25 (1958).

19.
20.
21.
22.

La Follette, 450 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.

1911 Wis. Laws ch. 300.
1949 Wis. Laws ch. 406.
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mary, 2 3 recommended that participation in Democratic presidential primaries be restricted to persons publicly declaring their affiliation with the Democratic Party.
As a result of its studies, the National Party added rules 2A, 2B
and 2C to the selection rules for the 1980 convention. Rule 2A limited participation in presidential primary elections to Democrats
who had publicly recorded their preference for the Democratic
Party. Rule 2B declared that no exceptions to rule 2A would be
granted. Rule 2C provided that state parties precluded by state law
from complying with rule 2A would have to devise an alternate delegate selection system which would insure that all participants in the
selection process were Democrats.2 4
The National Party rules required that if states chose to select
or bind delegates by primary election results, such elections must be
closed to all but Democrats. Wisconsin law mandated that convention delegates sign an oath of affirmation binding them to primary
election results, and that the primary be open to all voters regardless
of party affiliation. The Democratic Party of the State of Wisconsin
(State Party) was thus faced with the unhappy choice of either
abandoning the open primary in favor of some other party-run delegate selection system pursuant to National Party rule 2C, persuading the state legislature to close Wisconsin's primary, or contesting
rule 2A. It chose the third alternative.
The State Party announced that delegates to the 1980 National
Convention would be bound by the results of Wisconsin's open primary, consistent with Wisconsin law and contrary to rules 2A and
2C. The National Party countered by threatening that if Wisconsin
delegates were so selected, they would not be seated at the National
Convention.25 In reaction to this ultimatum, Wisconsin's Attorney
23. Adamany, Crossover Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, 10 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 536, 538-39 (1976).
24.
Delegate Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic National Convention, rule 2,
provides:
2A. Participation in the delegate selection process in primaries . . . shall be restricted to Democratic voters only who publicly declare their party preference and
have that preference publicly recorded.
2B. A(n) exception shall not be granted from Rule 2A requirements.
2C. A state party which is precluded by state statute from complying with this rule
(2A) shall adopt and implement an alternative party-run delegate selection system
which complies with this rule.
25. Rule 2A was added to the delegate selection rules for the 1976 Convention. However, at the state's request, Wisconsin was granted an exception. Shortly thereafter, the National Party made it clear that exceptions would not be made at future conventions, approved
rule 2B for the 1980 Convention, see supra note 24, and warned the State Party that it would
either have to influence Wisconsin to close its primaries, devise an alternative system of dele-
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General, Bronson La Follette, joined by the State Party, petitioned
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to enjoin the National Party from
refusing to seat the Wisconsin delegation.
The National Party argued that any attempt to compel it to
accept delegates bound by open primary results would interfere substantially with its first amendment right to associate-to define and
limit its membership as it chooses. 26 This led the National Party to
conclude that any interest Wisconsin might have in retaining the
did not justify binding delegates by open primary reopen primary
27
sults.
The State of Wisconsin and the State Party maintained that
the open feature of Wisconsin's primary was an indispensable component of the state's electoral system, a tradition paramount in preserving the confidence of Wisconsin citizens in their elections. 28 The
state contended that any burden on the National Party's first
amendment freedoms flowing from a requirement that it acknowledge delegates bound by open primary results was minimal at most;
National Party rule 2A accepted delegates bound by closed primary
outcomes, and the Party's studies did not produce reliable evidence
that the difference between open and closed primary results would
be substantial.29
gate selection, or not have a Wisconsin delegation seated at the 1980 Convention. J. DAVIS,
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 77 n.10 (1980); XXXVII CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP'T, 1614 (Aug. 4,
1979). The State Party ignored the ultimatum, and in so doing called the National Party's
bluff; on July 20, 1980, the Credentials Committee decided to seat the Wisconsin delegation at
the 1980 National Convention, despite the state's failure to comply with rule 2. Because the
Wisconsin Supreme Court order compelling the National Party to accept the Wisconsin delegation would apply not only to the 1980 Convention, but to future conventions as well, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that the case was not moot. La Follette, 450 U.S. at
115. Subsequent to the Court's decision in La Follette, the State Party petitioned the National
Party to exempt Wisconsin from rule 2A at the 1984 Convention. The petition was rejected.
Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
26. Brief for Appellant Democratic Party of the United States at 23-29, Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
27. Id. at 29, 31-32.
28. Brief for Appellee, Democratic Party of Wisconsin at 35, Democratic Party of the
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Brief for Appellee State of
Wisconsin at 18-21, 34-35, Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
29. Brief for Appellee Democratic Party of Wisconsin at 20-28; Brief for Appellee State
of Wisconsin at 24-32. Neither Wisconsin nor the State Party, however, argued that the open
primary was supported by a compelling state interest. The State of Wisconsin, while asserting
a substantial state interest, emphasized that since the open primary law imposed no genuine
burden on the National Party's associational freedoms, the law need only advance a legitimate state interest, and thus the question of whether Wisconsin's interest was compelling
need not be reached. Brief for Appellee State of Wisconsin at 32-34. The State Party never
broached the subject of the state's interest in its brief. At oral argument, the State Party
acknowledged that it stopped short of claiming that the law was supported by a compelling
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A unanimous Wisconsin Supreme Court held in favor of the
State of Wisconsin. The issue, as characterized by the Wisconsin
court, was whether the burden imposed by Wisconsin's open primary statute on the National Party's freedom to associate was substantial enough to outweigh the state's interest in preserving the
open feature of its primary.3 0 Concluding that studies advanced by
the National Party failed to demonstrate that the open feature of
Wisconsin's primary would have a significant effect on the National
Party's selection of Democratic candidates, the court decided that
the burden of Wisconsin's statute on the associational freedoms of
the National Party was not substantial but rather was "speculative,
remote and minimal." 3 The court also determined that the open
primary was crucial to encouraging voter participation and to sustaining the longstanding tradition of nonpartisan primaries in Wisconsin. It therefore held that the state's compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of its electoral process by retaining the open
primary outweighed whatever minimal burdens were consequently
imposed upon the National Party.3 2
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN LA FOLLETTE

The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding in favor of
the National Party. Justice Stewart, writing for a majority of six,
characterized the issue not in terms of Wisconsin's interest in retaining its open primary, but rather in terms of Wisconsin's interest in
requiring the National Party to accept delegates bound to vote in
accord with the results of its open primary.33 While Wisconsin
might even have a compelling interest in retaining the open feature
of its primary, the Court held that it did not have a similarly comstate interest. Oral Argument of Robert H. Friebert on behalf of the Appellees at 34-35, Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
The State Party also argued that the activity of the National Party was so related to
running the government as to constitute state action, and that therefore the National Party
was prohibited from infringing citizens' rights of association, privacy and voting. Brief for
Appellee Democratic Party of Wisconsin at 9-14, 30-33. In Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477
(1974), the Court expressly reserved the question of whether state action analysis applied to
national political parties. Id. at 483 n.4 (1975). For whatever reason, the La Follette Court
chose not to address Wisconsin's state action claim. For a discussion of state action in the
context of presidential candidate selection (by an author who subsequently wrote the state
action portion of the State Party's brief in La FoUette), see Comment, State Action in Presidential Candidate Selection, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 1269.
30. State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party of the United States, 93 Wis. 2d 473,
481-82, 287 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
31. Id. at 511, 287 N.W.2d at 536.
32. Id. at 515, 287 N.W.2d at 538.
33. La Folette, 450 U.S. at 120.
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pelling interest in demanding'that the National Party accept the
Wisconsin delegation.34
Citing the 1975 case of Cousins v. Wigoda35 as controlling, the
Court observed that "'[t]he National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association."' 36 Exercise of that right presupposes the freedom to identify
members, limit membership and prevent participation in party
decisionmaking by persons unaffiliated with the party.37 The Court
reasoned that, to the extent the National Party chose to disregard
open primary results as reflecting, at least in part, the will of persons
unaffiliated with the Party, Wisconsin's attempt to require the National Party to accept delegates sworn to vote in accord with the
open primary outcome interfered with the National Party's freedom
of association. 3"
Unlike the Wisconsin court, the Supreme Court declined to address the question of whether compelling the National Party to suspend rule 2A and accept delegates bound by open primary results
would create a significant as opposed to a minor burden on the National Party's associational freedoms.39 The Court maintained that
rules concerning National Party acceptance or rejection of a state's
delegation ought not to be established by the states or courts, but by
the party-first, because the National Party's freedom to choose
among various ways of limiting its membership and participation is
constitutionally protected regardless of how "unwise and irrational" the choice may be, 4 ° and second, because it is the National
Party that has studied the problem and is most competent to decide
such issues.4 1
The Court acknowledged that even though requiring the National Party to modify its rules and accept the Wisconsin delegation
would constitute an infringement of the National Party's freedom to
associate, the right to associate is not absolute, and the state would
34.
35.

Id. at 120-21, 124-25.
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).

36.

Id. at 121.

37.

Id. at 122.

38. Id. at 125-26.
39. The Court observed, "the state argues that its law places only a minor burden on
the National Party. The National Party argues that the burden is substantial .. .But it is
not for the courts to mediate the merits of this dispute." Id. at 123. While the Court thus
refused to analyze the extent of the associational burden imposed on the Party by state law, it
later concluded that "the interests advanced by the state do not justify its substantial intrusion into the associational freedom of members of the National Party." Id. at 125-26 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124.
40.
41.
Id.
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prevail if able to demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying
the imposition of its will on the National Party.4 2 Relying again on
Cousins v. Wigoda, the Court concluded that "'[the state's] interest
in protecting the integrity of its electoral process cannot be deemed
compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party convention."' 4 3 While Wisconsin does have a "substantial interest in the manner in which its elections are conducted," 4 4 that interest pertains solely "to the conduct of the
Presidential preference primary-not to the imposition of voting requirements upon those who, in a separate process, are eventually
selected as delegates." 4 5 Thus Wisconsin is free to retain its open
primary, but the National Party is equally free to ignore it, and to
deny a place to delegates bound by its results.
III. PRECEDENT: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF PARTY AND STATE
IN PREVIOUS CASES

The rationale generally employed by courts evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions imposed by state statutes on party autonomy has involved a balancing of the state's interest in imposing
the restriction against the party's interest in being free from the restriction.4 6 The state certainly has an interest in promoting the welfare of its citizens by preserving the integrity of its electoral process.4 7 By authorizing and enforcing measures designed to insure
that elections within the state are conducted fairly, the legitimacy of
the state is reaffirmed in the minds of majority and minority alike. 4"
At the same time, the political party has an interest in seeing that its
members are free to associate and nominate political candidates
42.

Id.

43. Id. at 121.
44. Id. at 126.
45. Id. at 125.
46. Laurence Tribe has characterized the test as follows:
Once one reaches the merits the analytic paradigm employed in determining the constitutionality of state impingements upon party autonomy is a familiar one: mild
restrictions on political parties must relate rationally to some legitimate stage interest; if a state rule substantially erodes the freedom of association of party members,
however, the rule will be upheld only if it is shown necessary to serve a compelling
state interest.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786 (1978).
47. Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 197 (1979); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752,761 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,345 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
145 (1972).
48.
C. FRIEDRICH, MAN AND His GOVERNMENT 258-59 (1963); V.0. KEY, POLITICS,
PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 543-44 (1964); Note, Developments in the Law-Elections, 88

HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1211 (1974).
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without interference-an interest protected by the first amendment
of the United States Constitution.4 9 On those occasions when a dispute arises from a state's attempt to regulate its elections in a manner alleged to interfere with a political party's candidate selection
process, the question for the courts becomes one of how the respective interests of party and state are to be balanced.
Freedom of association is among the fundamental liberties held
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. 5" For that reason, state laws imposing
substantial burdens on the freedom to associate are unconstitutional
unless absolutely necessary to serve a compelling state interest.5 1
Even if a particular state objective is of "compelling interest," the
means employed to further that objective must be carefully tailored
to minimize interference with associational freedoms. 5 2 By contrast,
state laws that impose minor restrictions on associational activities
are constitutional as long as they promote a legitimate state inter53
est.
The freedom to associate for the purpose of furthering an end
within the electoral process is extended not only to political parties,
but to individual voters as well. The balancing process does not
make the nature of the litigant asserting an abridgment of liberty a
variable: a law substantially burdening associational freedoms is unconstitutional absent a showing of compelling state interest regard-

49.

Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57

(1973).
50.

Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-

31; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964).
. 51. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975) (state interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process is not compelling in the context of selecting delegates to national
political party conventions, see infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-25 (1960) (state's request for NAACP membership lists substantially
encroached on NAACP's freedom to associate; the state's interest in levying occupational
license taxes bore no relevant correlation to requiring the production of the lists and was
therefore insufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 463 (1958) (state court order for production of NAACP membership lists presented insufficiently compelling state interest to justify the deterrent effect that the order would have on

the right of association).
52. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343
(1972).
53. Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 196, 199 (1979) (in the absence of a showing
that the party's freedom to associate has been substantially burdened, a state may further its
legitimate interest in regulating its elections by requiring that each state party maintain a

representative central committee, see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying texts); Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760-62 (1973) (a party affiliation statute which inconveniences but
does not prohibit voters from participating in the primary of their choice is justified by the
legitimate state interest of preventing voter "raiding", see infra notes 56-62 and accompany-

ing text).
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less of whether the statute is challenged by a voter or a political
party. Nevertheless, the identity of the litigant may affect the
Court's assessment of when the state's interest in regulation is compelling or merely legitimate, and likewise whether the abridgment of
freedom resulting from the law is minimal or substantial. By comparing a number of cases in which the litigant asserting a deprivation of associational freedoms is a voter with cases in which the litigant is a political party, the seemingly special status accorded the
political party's freedom to function will become manifest.
A. Conflicts Between State Law and Associational Freedoms of
Individual Voters
A review of Rosario v. Rockefeller"4 and Kusper v. Pontikes" illustrates the manner in which the Court has distinguished minimal
from substantial burdens on associational freedoms, and legitimate
from compelling state interests in the context of voter-state conflicts. At issue in Rosario was a New York election law which provided that all voters must publicly declare party affiliation thirty
days before the annual general election in order to be eligible to vote
in a subsequent primary.5 6 The law was designed to discourage
voter "raiding" 5 7 at the primary election. The assumption was that
citizens would be unlikely to profess allegiance to an opposing party
for the purpose of sabotaging its primary several months away while
planning to vote for the party they genuinely favor at the general
election thirty days off.5"
Pedro Rosario did not register his party affiliation in time to be
eligible to vote in the 1972 presidential primary election, and was
prohibited from casting a ballot. Rosario sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the statute abridged his freedom to associate
with the party of his choice. The Supreme Court rejected Rosario's
claim. The Court observed that the New York election law did not
prohibit anyone from voting, but only imposed a time limit on when
voters could enroll. Any disenfranchisement would be caused not by
the law, but by the voters' failure to take the steps necessary to
render themselves eligible. 5 9 Because the law did not "'lock' a voter
54. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
55. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
56. N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 186 (Consol. 1973).
57. "Raiding" is the practice of voting in the primary of the party the voter opposes, in
an effort to skew the primary results in favor of a candidate the voter perceives as most vulnerable at the general election.
-58. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 761.
59. Id. at 758.
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into a pre-existing party affiliation," 6 ° and employed a suitable
means for pursuing the legitimate state interest of preventing "raiding", 6 1 it did not constitute an "unconstitutionally onerous burden"
on the voters' freedoms of association.62
Kusper v. Pontikes concerned Section 7-43(d) of the Illinois
Election Code, which prohibited persons from voting in a political
party's primary if they had voted in the primary of another party
within the previous twenty-three months.63 Harriet Pontikes filed a
complaint for injunctive relief after being prohibited by the statute
from voting in the Republican primary in February 1971, and the
Democratic primary in March 1972. She, like Pedro Rosario, alleged
that the statute infringed upon her freedom to associate with the
political party of her choice. The United States Supreme Court held
in favor of Pontikes, concluding that the statute substantially burdened voters' freedom to associate, employed an unnecessarily drastic means for pursuing the state's interest in preventing raiding and
was therefore unconstitutional. The Court observed that:
By preventing the appellee from participating at all in Democratic primary elections during the statutory period, the Illinois statute deprived
her of any voice in choosing the party's candidates, and thus substantially abridged her ability to associate effectively with the party of her
choice. 6 4

Rosario was distinguished on the ground that the burden on Rosario was insubstantial because the statute did not prevent him from
voting in the primary of his choice; any effect the statute might have
in rendering citizens ineligible to vote in the primary of their choice
would be entirely the result of carelessness. By contrast, the Illinois
statute locked voters into preexisting party affiliations, the only
means for release being not voting at all for nearly two years. 65 The
Court acknowledged that Illinois' interest in preventing voter raiding was no less legitimate than that of New York.6 6 It was unnecessary, however, for the Court to determine whether Illinois' interest
could be classified as compelling, because regardless of how important the state's objective might be, it could be attained by "less
drastic means" which would not burden the voters' freedoms of as60. Id. at 759.
61.. Id. at 761-62.
62. Id. at 760.
63.

ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 46, § 7-43 (1975).

64.
65.
66.

Kusper, 414 U.S. at 58.
Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 59-60.
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sociation so substantially.6 7
Distinguishing between minimal and substantial burdens on a
voter's freedom to associate with the party of his or her choice would
thus appear to depend on whether the voter is merely inconvenienced in his or her efforts to affiliate with a particular party-in
which case the burden is classified as minimal-or has been completely stymied in such efforts, at which point the burden becomes
substantial. Lower court decisions after Kusper and Rosario are consistent with this formulation. 6" As noted earlier, however, these
cases concern the associational freedoms of individual voters, not
political parties. Cousins v. Wigoda6 9 indicates that the Court is considerably less willing to tolerate any ascertainable interference with
associational rights when the rights at stake are those of a political
party.
B. Conflicts Between State Law and the Associational Freedoms of
PoliticalParties
In Cousins v. Wigoda, a slate of delegates (the Wigoda delegation) whose composition conformed with Illinois law was selected in
a direct primary election to represent the state at the 1972 Democratic National Convention. The composition criteria established
by Illinois statute differed from those of the National Democratic
Party. As a consequence, the National Party selected a different delegation (the Cousins delegation), which had adhered to the Party's
slatemaking criteria, to represent Illinois at the National Convention. Members of the unseated Wigoda delegation brought an action
to enjoin the National Party from seating the Cousins delegation in
their place.
The Illinois Court of Appeals held for the Wigoda delegation. °
67. Id. at 61.
68. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121. 137-39 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (requirement
that independent candidates for president file nomination papers 75 days before the primary
election violates the candidate's right to equal protection and the voters' freedom to affiliate
with the candidate; Rosario is distinguishable by the fact that the means chosen to further
Ohio's interest in political stability unnecessarily and arbitrarily restrict the freedoms of candidate and voter); Young v. Gardner, 497 F. Supp. 396, 400-02 (D.N.H. 1980) (a requirement
that voters register party affiliation at least 97 days before the primary does not lock voters
into a preexisting party affiliation; the requirement pursues a legitimate state interest, and is
therefore constitutional by the standard employed in Rosario); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F.
Supp. 837, 846-47 (D. Conn. 1976) (affiliation requirement, in and of itself, does not unnecessarily burden voters' freedom to associate, for while it requires a public affirmation of party
loyalty, it does not present an "absolute barrier" to participation in primary elections, and it
furthers the legitimate state interest of preventing raiding).
69. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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The Supreme Court reversed. 1 Justice Brennan, writing for an
eight-member majority, declared that the National Party enjoys a
constitutionally protected right of association. The Court observed
that inherent in that right is the National Party's freedom to define
and limit membership as it chooses; a state law that acts to deny the
National Party its preference as to which delegates are to represent
the Party membership at the National Convention substantially
burdens the National Party's freedoms of association.7 2 The Court
also concluded that the state's interest in the integrity of its electoral process is not compelling within the context of selecting delegates to the National Convention.7 3 It firmly declared that the
states have no constitutionally mandated role in the nomination
process.7 4 However legitimate the state's interest might be in seeing
that delegates representing the state are fairly selected, the majority
was satisfied that such an interest is in no way compelling because
the National Party, not the individual state, is best suited to decide
how the nominating convention should be run.7 5 The convention is
national in character; to permit each of the states to impose its own
peculiar restrictions on the manner in which delegates are selected to
the convention, the Court concluded, would destroy the efficiency of
the nominating process.7 6
While the Court may thus be unwilling to sanction any appreciable state intrusion into political party activity, Marchiorov. Chaney 7 7 suggests that the Court still must be satisfied that some sort of
intrusion has occurred. In Marchioro, a Washington statute provided that each major political party within the state must have a
state committee composed of two representatives from each county.
The Democratic Party of Washington decided to add members to
the state committee in excess of those required by statute. The new
members, however, were not seated by the Washington Democratic
Party out of concern that doing so would violate the statute. The
unseated representatives sought an injunction against the state, as70.
(1975).
71.

Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 477

72.

Id. at 488. The Cousins delegates argued that barring them from participation at

419 U.S. 477.

the National Convention constituted a "significant interference" with their associational free-

doms. The Wigoda delegates' response was not that the interference was insubstantial, but
that the state's interest was sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion. Id. at 488-89.
73. Id. at 491.
74.
75.

Id. at 489-90.
Id.

76.

Id. at 490.

77.

442 U.S. 191 (1979).
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serting that their freedom to associate had been substantially burdened. The Supreme Court rejected this claim. Justice Stevens,
writing for a unanimous Court, observed that:
Instead of persuading us that this is a case in which a state statute has
imposed substantial burdens on the party's right to govern its affairs,
appellants' own statement of the facts establishes that it is the party's
exercise8 of that very right that is the source of whatever burdens they
7
suffer.

Between the years that Cousins and La Follette were decided,
virtually no opportunities arose for the courts to resolve party-state
conflicts. In those instances in which the matter was touched upon in
dicta, the courts tended toward an interpretation of Cousins typified
by Judge Wilkey's observation in a concurring opinion in Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party:9 "The Supreme Court in
Cousins v. Wigoda made it abundantly clear that the individual
states are powerless to impose their will on a national partynominating convention in any manner that would interfere with the almost unfettered discretion of the parties in naming candidates."' 0
One case in which a court was called upon to clarify the rights and
responsibilities of party and state in the nominating process, was
Ferency v. Austin."' In Ferency, the Michigan District Court was
presented with a fact pattern very similar to that in La Follette. The
National Democratic Party had adopted rule 2A, calling for an end
to reliance upon open primary elections. The Michigan Democratic
Party decided to abandon the state's open primary in favor of a
state party caucus. The plaintiff, a private citizen, sought to compel

78.
Id. at 199. The Marchioro Court distinguished Cousins on the ground that in
Marchioro, the associational burden was insubstantial. Id. at 199 n.4. There is, however, a
second associational difference: Marchioroinvolved the rights of a state rather than a national
political party. The relevance of such a difference is discussed infra Section VI.
79. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
80.
Id. at 608 (Wilkey, J., concurring) (assuming, without deciding, that the equal
protection clause applies to political parties, the voters' interest in a roughly representative
distribution of delegates among the states is inferior to the party's freedom from interference
in the delegate selection process); American Independent Party v. Austin, 420 F. Supp. 670,
673 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding that the national convention, not the general election, is the
proper forum for deciding which of two slates of candidates is ultimately to represent the
party; the state may properly refuse the party's request that alternative slates of candidates
be listed on the general election ballot; "The National AIP party convention . . . is a proper
forum for resolving intraparty disputes . . . and there are pervasive national interests in
leaving the selection of candidates for national office to the national party conventions, rather
than to the states."). But see Fallon v. State Bd. of Elections of New York, 408 F. Supp. 636,
638 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Whether the Cousins decision can thus be read to hold that any
national party rule overrules a contrary state election requirement is at best questionable.").
81. 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
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the state to require the National Party to abide by Michigan's open
primary statute. The district court dismissed the complaint. Citing
Cousins as controlling, the court held that the state's interest in
keeping its primary open was insufficiently compelling to justify an
abridgment of the National Party's freedom to limit participation in
its candidate selection process to Democrats only-"an interest
which goes to the very heart of the Party's associational rights."8 2
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING TEST AS
APPLIED IN LA FOLLETTE

Commentators have observed that the Court's decision to apply a compelling state interest test in a given case all but guarantees
that the legislation under consideration will be held unconstitutional.8 3 The real question, then, is not whether the particular statute can survive the exacting scrutiny of a compelling state interest
test, but rather whether the circumstances of the case warrant the
Court's application of the tougher standard in the first place. A comparison of the factual settings of La Follette and its controlling case,
Cousins, reveals significant differences that would seem to militate
against the application in La Follette of scrutiny as exacting as that
applied in Cousins. 4
The statute at issue in Cousinsdirectly affected the composition
of the Illinois delegation at the National Convention, whereas the
impact of the Wisconsin statute on its delegation was indirect. Justice Powell observed in his dissent 5 that Cousins involved an attempt to replace a delegation favored by the National Party with
one selected in accord with Illinois' primary results. Illinois' preference would alter the actual composition of the Democratic Convention membership. By contrast, the Wisconsin law did not affect the
composition of the state's delegation, but only how the members
must, within limits, cast their ballots at the National Convention.
In this respect, Wisconsin's law burdened the National Party's freedom to associate and limit membership to a lesser degree than did
the Illinois statute in Cousins, and Cousins is inapplicable to state
regulations that do not substantially burden the Party's freedom to
82.

Id. at 693-94.

83.
L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 1000-01; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 TermForward:In Search of Evolving Doctrineon a ChangingCourt:A Model for a NewerEqual Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).

84.

This is true only to the extent that these cases are evaluated solely in terms of a

balancing of constitutional interests. See infra Section V.
85.
La Follette, 450 U.S. at 128-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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At the same time, the state interest advanced in La Follette may
be stronger than that in Cousins. In Cousins, the Wigoda delegates
objected to their being unseated in favor of the Cousins delegation
on the ground that the State of Illinois had a compelling interest in
protecting open primary results as a means of preserving the integrity of its electoral process; since the Wigoda delegation won the direct primary, it should be the delegation seated at the Convention.
The state's interest related to preserving the direct primary outcome, not the direct primary itself, i.e., the National Party disregarded direct primary results favoring the Wigoda delegation not
because of the Party's objection to the state's direct primary, but
because of the Wigoda delegation's failure to abide by the Party's
slatemaking procedure prior to the election, when the delegation
was assembled."7
In La Follette, on the other hand, the Democratic Party's refusal to seat delegates bound by open primary results threatened
Wisconsin's interest in preserving not only its open primary results,
but also the open primary itself. The La Follette Court emphasized
that the National Party's decision not to accept delegates bound by
open primary outcomes in no way prohibited the state from conducting an open primary-as long as it was willing to incur the cost
of being denied a voice at the National Convention." As a practical
matter, however, this cost would inevitably outweigh any benefits
to keeping the primary open, since if the voters' choice is ignored,
there is little consolation in knowing that the privacy of the voters'
party preferences is preserved. Thus, the rejection of delegates
bound by open primary results is tantamount to a prohibition of
open primaries. In both Cousins and La Follette, the state asserted
an interest in preserving the integrity of its electoral process by protecting primary results. In La Follette, however, the state's interest
went beyond protecting the people's choice in a particular primary
election to preserving the vitality of an institution that had been
part of the state's electoral process for seventy-five years.8 9
Despite these apparent differences, the La Follette Court found
the case before it indistinguishable from Cousins in any meaningful
respect. The Court's rationale is, as in related cases, framed in terms
of the balancing test. In striking the balance, the majority con86.
87.
88.
89.

See Marchioro, 442 U.S. at 199 n.4 (1979).
Cousins, 419 U.S. at 478-80.
La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126.
See supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text.
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cluded that Wisconsin's open primary law imposed a substantial
burden on the Democratic Party's freedom to function and failed to
further a compelling state interest. In ceriain respects, the Court's
characterization of the statute is peculiarly strained.
A. The Extent of the Burden on Association
At the close of the majority opinion, the Court concluded that
Wisconsin's statute created a "substantial intrusion [upon] the associational freedom of the members of the National Party."9 0 Earlier
on, however, the Court declined to assess whether Wisconsin's law
placed a minor or substantial burden on the National Party, concluding that such questions were for the Party, not the courts, to
answer. 9
The rationale advancing the first of these two seemingly contradictory conclusions, that Wisconsin's law imposed a substantial burden on the National Party, is somewhat circular. Wisconsin law required that delegates cast their ballots in accord with the results of
the open primary. In support of its determination that the resulting
burden was substantial, the Court reiterated that Wisconsin law
compelled delegates to abide by the results of the open primary, and
cast their votes accordingly. 9 2 This explanation begs the essential
question of what it is about the open primary law that substantially
intruded into the associational freedoms of the Party. National
Party rules permit the states to bind delegates to vote in accord with
closed, but not open primary results. Are open primary results sufficiently different from those of closed primaries that compelling the
National Party to accept delegates bound by them would constitute
a substantial burden on its associational freedoms? The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist9 3and Blackmun in
dissent, answered this question in the negative.
90. La Folette, 450 U.S. at 125-26.
91. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
92.
[T]he Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently deduced that the effects of the open primary on the nominating process were minimal. But the Court ignored the fact-the
crucial fact in the case-that under Wisconsin law state delegates are bound to cast
their votes at the National Convention in accord with the open primary outcomes.
La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126 n.32.
93. La Follette, 93 Wis. 2d at 511, 287 N.W.2d at 535; La Folette, 450 U.S. at 134
(Powell, J., dissenting). One commentator has contended that:
Both the Wisconsin court and Justice Powell missed the point. As an association, the
DNP (Democratic National Party) may wish to strengthen or change itself. The
Wisconsin Law could prevent the DNP from implementing any of its own judgments
about who should participate in its most critical function-candidate selection.

1983:211

Associational Freedoms of PoliticalParties

229

The majority, by contrast, declined to answer altogether. Its
other conclusion, that the party, not the courts, should assess the
extent to which the state's law burdens party functioning, thus
leaves relatively impenetrable its subsequent determination that
the state's intrusion into the party's freedom was sufficiently substantial to render the statute unconstitutional absent a showing of
compelling state interest.
B. The Extent of the State's Interest
The Wisconsin Supreme Court had concluded that the open primary served a compelling state interest by "encouraging increased
voter participation in the political process . . . thereby assuring
that the primary itself and the political party's participation in the
primary are conducted in a fair and orderly manner." 9 4 The United
States Supreme Court agreed that "[u]pon this issue, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court may well be correct." 9 Yet while Wisconsin may
have a compelling interest in retaining its primary, the Court concluded that it had no similarly compelling interest in ensuring that
the National Party accept its results. 9 6
The state's interest in preserving the open primary cannot easily be separated from its interest in requiring the National Party to
accept delegates bound by its outcome. Voters disinclined to align
themselves publicly with a particular political party may be unwilling to participate in closed primaries. By not requiring public declarations of party affiliation, the open primary encourages voter participation and thereby furthers the state's interest. If, however, the
voter is aware that his or her open primary ballot would be tabulated by the state and reported to the state party, only to be ignored
What meaning can freedom of association have if the association has no control over

who can participate in its decision making?
Note, DemocraticParty v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette: May States Impose Open PrimaryResuits Upon National PartyConventions?, 59 DEN. L.J. 611, 620 (1982).

The Wisconsin law, however, did not strip the National Party of all control over the
candidate selection process. The National Party retained complete control over the composition of the delegation participating at the national convention (see supra note 86 and accompanying text); the Wisconsin law simply assured that the ballots cast by those delegates
would be responsive to the state's open primary results. The question that remains is whether
the state's interference, while less than complete, is nonetheless substantial. This in turn
would seem to mandate an inquiry into the extent to which the open primary law restricted
the National Party's freedom to define and limit its membership. Section V, infra, proffers a
possible explanation of why the Supreme Court declined to embark on such an inquiry.
94.
La Follette, 93 Wis. 2d at 512, 287 N.W.2d at 536 (1980).

95.
96.

La Follette, 450 U.S. at 121.
Id. at 125-26.
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by the delegates responsible for selecting the presidential nominee at
the national convention, in what way could the open primary elicit
any, let alone encourage, voter participation? For Wisconsin to preserve the integrity of its open primary and thereby further its interest in encouraging voter participation, it would appear essential
that the state have the authority to ensure that open primary results
are meaningful. If the state's interest in retaining the open primary
is compelling, its interest in binding national convention delegates
to vote in accord with open primary outcomes would seem equally
compelling. The Court's conclusion that Wisconsin's interest in preserving its open primary is substantial, yet not incompatible with
the National Party's freedom to disregard the open primary results,
would seem inconsistent with the notion that the state has a valid
interest in preserving a fair and meaningful electoral process.
Confining one's analysis of La Follette to the four corners of the
balancing test yields a rather unsettling result. The burden upon the
associational freedoms of the National Party is labeled "substantial" without meaningful explanation, and the characterization of
the state's interest neglects to include the vitality of Wisconsin's
open primary as among the interests at stake should the statute be
struck down. In short, the outcome of a straightforward balancing
of constitutional interests would appear to favor the State of Wisconsin. Still, given the Court's hesitation to sanction any appreciable interference with political party decisionmaking in Cousins v.
Wigoda and subsequent cases, it comes as no great surprise that the
party prevailed in La Follette. By itself, the balancing test does not
provide a coherent explanation for why the associational freedoms
of political parties are treated with deference-a deference that has
not been extended, for example, to the first amendment freedoms of
individual voters. The explanation-and for that matter the justification-for the Court's decision in La Follette, lies in the outcome,
not of a balancing of interests, but rather of a comparison of institutional decisionmakers.
V. RECONSIDERATION OF LA FOLLETTE IN TERMS OF9 7A
COMPARISON ON INSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKERS

It is instructive to set the balancing test aside momentarily,

97.

For an elaboration on a comparative institutional approach to law, see Komesar, In

Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79
MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1981).
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and to consider separately the problem of identifying the decisionmaker best able to resolve disputes of the sort that arose in La
Follette. There are three alternatives. First, the courts could themselves assess the permissibility of particular state intrusions upon
associational freedoms, basing their decisions upon careful scrutiny
of data substantiating the extent to which a contested statute would
burden the party or further the state's interest. Second, the courts
could defer to the state legislatures on the issue of what sort of election regulations are reasonably necessary to further the state's interests. Third, the courts could refuse to permit state interference with
political party activities, thereby leaving it for the party to decide
whether a particular restriction is overly burdensome. The courts
consistently have chosen the third alternative; the question is, why?
The Court declined to assign itself the role of decisionmaker in
La Follette, on the ground that the courts may not interfere with a
party's expression of its first amendment freedoms, regardless of
whether a particular expression of those freedoms is regarded by the
Court as unwise.9 8 In the note accompanying this declaration, the
Court instructed the State of Wisconsin to direct its arguments concerning the lack of a need for a closed primary "to the National
Party-which has studied the need for something like Rule 2A for 12
years... and not to the judiciary." 9 9 Thus it would appear that the
Court's reluctance to impose its judgment in cases affecting political
party functioning derived from its belief that the Court is not as
competent as the party to decide such matters. This attitude, while
somewhat latent in La Follette, was plainly manifested in a 1972
case, O'Brien v. Brown. 10
In O'Brien, the Democratic National Convention Credentials
Committee had decided to unseat one hundred fifty-one California
delegates bound to vote for George McGovern in accord with the
state's winner-take-all primary law. Three days before the Convention opened, the Court was called upon to consider whether the decision of the Credentials Committee violated the delegates' constitutional due process rights.
The Court declined to address the merits of the dispute and
granted a stay of the judgment of the court of appeals (which had
held in favor of the unseated delegates),"0 1 thereby permitting the
decision of the credentials committee to stand. The Court justified
98.
99.

La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124.
Id. at 124 n.27.

100.

409 U.S. 1 (1972).

101.

Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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its decision on three grounds: (1) the queston presented may well
have been political and therefore nonjusticiable; (2) there was insufficient time for the Court to resolve the dispute adequately; and (3)
the Convention was an available and appropriate forum to review

10 2
the decision of the Credentials Committee.
Technically, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether the
Credentials Committee decision presented a nonjusticiable political
question.' 0 3 As a practical matter, however, O'Brien has been read
to stand for the proposition that the Court will be hesitant to resolve
delegate selection disputes because it regards them as political
problems best left for resolution at the convention, not in the courtroom.'0 4 The political question analysis in O'Brien was abandoned

in Cousins to the extent that in Cousins the Court reached the merits. Nevertheless, the Court's disinclination to become involved in
political party disputes remained.' 0 1 Subsequent interpretations of
Cousins and O'Brien are in general agreement that the two cases

stand for the proposition that the courts should not actively involve
themselves in political party disputes for the simple reason that they
are not in as effective a position as the political parties to resolve
6
0

them.1
Just as the La Follette Court was loathe to permit the courts to
second guess the decisions of political parties, it was equally unwill-

ing to allow the state legislature to substitute its judgment for that
102. O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 3-4.
103. Commentators have observed that the Court did not hold, but rather merely intimated that the merits of O'Brien were nonjusticiable. L. TRIBE, supranote 46, at 785; Note,
The Supreme Court and the Credentials Challenge Cases: Ask a PoliticalQuestion, you get a
Political Answer, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1344, 1349-51 (1974).
104.
This was Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of O'Brien in Republican St. Cent.
Comm. v. Ripon Soc'y Inc., 409 U.S. 1222, 1225-66 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice).
See also Raymar, JudicialReview of CredentialsContests: The Experience of the 1972 Democratic
National Convention, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1973); Note, Mandates of the National
Political Party Clash with Interests of the Individual States as the Party Executes its Policy by
Abolition of State Delegate Selection Results: Legal Issues of the 1972 DemocraticConvention and
Beyond, 4 Loy. CHI. L.J. 137, 150-54 (1973); Note, PoliticalParties,Courts and the Political
Question Doctrine: New Developments, 52 OR. L. REV. 269, 279-82 (1973).
105.
In Cousins, the Court concluded, citing O'Brien, that "this is a case where 'the
convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates should be seated."' Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491.
106. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 250 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (citing Cousins
and O'Brien for the proposition that the courts have refrained from becoming involved in
disputes concerning the seating of delegates because management of the Convention is better
left in the hands of the party, not "Government inspectors"); McMenamin v. Philadelphia
County Democratic Executive Comm., 405 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (O'Brienand
Cousins "counsel restraint when courts are tempted to interject themselves in intra-party
political disputes"); E. CORWIN, H. CHASE, & C. DUCAT, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY 455 (1978).
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of the party. The Court acknowledged that the legislature has a substantial interest in regulating presidential primaries conducted
within its borders. It concluded, however, that this interest did not
extend to regulating the response of the National Democratic Convention, composed of representatives duly selected from forty-nine
other states, to the results of Wisconsin's primary. 10 7 In other
words, the Wisconsin legislature is well suited to make policy determinations that burden or benefit citizens within the State of Wisconsin, since the decisions of the legislature reflect, at least in theory,
the preferences of the citizens who elected the legislators into office.
For that same reason, the Wisconsin legislature is ill equipped to
decide matters of nationwide policy, because the views of citizens in
all states but Wisconsin would be unrepresented in the decisions
made. Wisconsin's effort to force the Democratic Party to accept
delegates bound by open primary outcomes can be seen as an 'attempt by an individual state to impose its preferred policy upon a
national population diametrically opposed to such policy. 10 8 In
Cousins v. Wigoda, the Court observed that "[ijf the qualifications
and eligibility of delegates to the national political party conventions were left to state law, 'each of the fifty states could establish
the qualifications of its delegates to the various party conventions
without regard to party policy, an obviously intolerable result."'"1 9
"Party policy" embodies the reasoned judgment of the National
Party heirarchy, which in turn represents the interests of Democrats
across the nation. While the political party is by no means perfectly
representative, it is certainly in a better position to address the
needs of party members nationwide, and to devise a plan to meet
those needs, than is the legislature of any single state.
Decisions affecting the manner in which national conventions
107.

La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126.

108.

Questions asked of Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson La Follette at oral argu-

ment reflect the Court's concern on this point:
Mr. La Follette: Your Honor, the record which has been stipulated here contains all

of the relevant studies and scholarly articles . . . and they all conclude that there is
no evidence of raiding in this case ...
Question: But what you're saying then, is that the Democratic National Convention
meeting off in Memphis, Tennessee or in New York cannot have a different view of
the matter?
Mr. La Follette: Not when important constitutional concerns are properly arrested
for the authority of the state [sic]. ...
Question: Mr. Attorney General, isn't the real problem here that Wisconsin is extending its long-arm into the convention in another state?
Oral argument of Bronson C. La Follette on behalf of the appellees at 24-25, Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
109. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 490.
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are run are thus best left in the hands of the national political parties. A national party is more capable and competent than the courts
to resolve such matters, and provides a more efficient forum for
decisionmaking than the state legislatures. The apparent problems
of the La Follette Court's analysis that result from evaluating the
case solely in terms of a constitutional balancing of interests are
largely resolved when one steps back and reexamines the decision as
an effort, at least in part, to assign the task of dispute resolution to
the most efficient decisionmaker.
The Court's refusal to assess the extent to which Wisconsin's
open primary statute actually burdened the National Party, and the
Court's failure to include the survival of the open primary as an integral part of the state's interest, are not readily explicable in the
context of a constitutional balancing of interests, but can be understood as the consequence of a determination that party-state conflicts are best left for the party to resolve. The Court refused to second guess the National Party's conclusion that the open primary
statute is unduly burdensome, because the National Party, not the
Court, is more competent to make such a decision. At the same time,
the Court declined to consider the state's arguments challenging the
accuracy of the National Party's conclusion that the statute is
overly burdensome. Regardless of whether the state's assessment of
the situation happened to be correct in this particular instance, that
delegates bound by the results of Wisconsin's open primary did not
substantially interfere with the nomination process, the National
Party, not the state, is in a better position to decide such questions.
Similarly, it may be true that the open primary is of great importance to Wisconsin and cannot be preserved if the state is without
the power to compel the National Party to accept delegates bound
by primary results. However, to the extent that it is more appropriate for the Party, rather than the states, to determine national nominating procedures, Wisconsin is without authority to interfere, regardless of the magnitude of its interest is in preserving the open
feature of its primary.
The difference in the Court's treatment of the associational
freedoms of national political parties on the one hand, and individual voters on the other, may likewise be understood in terms of a
comparison of decisionmaking institutions. Unlike a political party,
the individual voter has no special competence or expertise warranting the Court's deference. If anything, the Court's previous experience with similar cases puts it in a considerably better position to
appraise the reasonableness of a particular state's restriction. Unlike
state regulation of national parties, state registration and voting re-
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quirements impact only on residents of the state-legislators responsible for unpopular restrictions may be voted out of office.
Whereas the courts have reason to be particularly wary of state laws
that affect nonresidents, e.g., the national membership of a political
party, who are unrepresented in the decisionmaking process, the
cause for concern is not as great in cases involving state residents.
The state's interest in voter affiliation cases is thus reasonably accorded greater weight than in cases where national political parties
are involved and, as a consequence, voting restrictions such as those
in Rosario have been upheld. 1 0
While the state legislature may generally be the institution best
able to oversee the orderly registration of voters within the state, it
is far from perfect. The legislature may be able to represent effectively the interests of the majority in many circumstances, but what
of the minority? There are occasions such as in Kusper, when the
will of the legislature, as reflected in the contested statute, fails to
account adequately for the interests of the minority of voters and so
severely restricts their associational freedoms that the Court will
deem itself better able to protect the neglected interest and intervene on behalf of the minority." 1
VI. THE FUTURE
The La Follette Court extended considerable deference to the
National Party's decision to disregard Wisconsin's open primary
statute. After La Follette, what if any role is left for the courts and
state legislatures in resolving party-state conflicts?
It remains the duty of the courts to make threshold determinations of whether a party's associational freedoms have been burdened. While a court may lack the expertise necessary to measure
the extent to which a statute intrudes upon a political party's rights
of association, a court is a more disinterested and therefore more
appropriate body than a political party to make the determination
of whether any intrusion upon rights of association has occurred in
the first place. A political party may be inclined out of self interest to
characterize as unconstitutional any state legislation causing even
minimal inconvenience to the party. The Marchioro decision indicates that the Court will not simply accept a party's word that its
rights are being violated, but rather will carefully scrutinize the
matter to discern for itself whether there has been an abridgment of
110.
111.

See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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first amendment rights. " 2 If a court is satisfied that the state law in
question exerts an ascertainable burden on a party's freedom to conduct its affairs as the party deems best, the party will be left to decide whether the burden is intolerable.
On the other hand, if the Court concludes, as it did in Marchioro, that the law does not interfere with the party's associational
rights, it remains the exclusive province of the state to regulate elections held within its borders. Even when the law does in some measure inconvenience the exercise of first amendment freedoms, the
Court may nevertheless be willing to side with the state if the statute does not tamper with national party policy. State laws affecting
the manner in which ballots are cast by the delegation of the enacting state may alter the candidate selection decision. Such a decision
is national in character and should not be left to the judgment of the
individual states. By contrast, when a state election statute is restricted in impact to its residents, the legislators, as representatives
of the citizens within the state, have operated within their sphere of
competence. In such a case, it is appropriate for the courts to defer
to the judgment of the legislatures and leave disgruntled citizens
with recourse to the polls to express dissatisfaction and implement
desired change." 3
The battle lines in future cases will be drawn along the question
of whether state laws constitute permissible regulation or exert ascertainable and therefore impermissible intrusions upon associational freedoms. Between Marchioro,which held that a state law exerting no more than an imaginary associational burden is
constitutional, and La Follette, which held that a state law controlling how party delegates vote at national conventions is unconstitutional, lies a somewhat murky, gray area. In an effort to sort
through the varying shades of gray, it is helpful to single out for
discussion some of the factors on which courts may rely, expressly or
otherwise, in resolving future party-state conflicts.
A. Presence of Issues Affecting Rights of Association
As a starting point, it is helpful to determine whether there is
any reasonable basis for contending that the contested state law
112.
113.

See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
This is not to suggest that courts will permit a state to run roughshod over the first

amendment freedoms of its residents. Rather, when the impact of a statute does not extend
beyond the borders of the state, one might anticipate that the court will engage in a balancing
of interests similar to that in Rosario and Kusper, in which the first amendment interests at
issue are accorded less deference. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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triggers a concern for the party's "associational rights," as that
term has been defined and limited by case law. The Court has extended to political parties the freedom to define and limit their membership and to select whomever they wish to run for public office. If
the impact of the law on the party's freedom to conduct its affairs is
purely speculative, as in Marchioro, concern for the party's rights of
association is premature, and the Court will likely defer to the judgment of the state legislature and uphold the statute. On the other
hand, if the state has sought to regulate a practice impacting on the
party's candidate or membership selection procedures, further analysis is necessary.
B. The Impact of the Law on Persons Outside the State
Assuming some sort of nexus between the state law and the
party's associational rights is established, the question then becomes whether the burden exerted by the statute on those rights is
sufficient to render the law unconstitutional. While rights-of-association cases arising in other contexts, e.g., voter-state conflicts discussed in Section III above, have been resolved through a careful
balancing of associational burdens and state interests, in party-state
conflicts the Court has tipped the balance heavily in favor of the
political parties. In assessing likely results in future cases, it is important to determine whether those policies underlying the Court's
favoring protection of parties apply with equal force to the case then
being considered.
One of the factors favoring protection of the party is the impact
of the state law on nonresident party members. The Court has
looked with extreme disfavor on laws that regulate matters affecting
a national party's selection procedures, since the effect of such laws
may be to impose the judgment of a single state legislature on individuals nationwide. The Court should be less concerned about laws
that exercise an impact exclusively on residents of the state responsible for the law. The Court may thus be more willing to engage in a
traditional balancing of interests if the law at issue regulates conduct principally within the state, e.g., statutes controlling the time,
place and manner in which primary elections are to be conducted, as
opposed to out of state, e.g., statutes affecting the conduct or composition of delegates to the national conventions, where*no apprecia14
ble interference will be tolerated.'

114.

One commentator has concluded in a similar vein, that:
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C. The Competence of the Court
Whenever a political party asserts that its constitutional rights
of association have been abridged by a state law, courts will be attentive to the special competence of the party to determine what is
in its best interest. If a state law prohibits or restricts activity the
party deems essential to its candidate or membership selection process, the courts will be disinclined to second guess the party's conclusion. While courts may generally be willing to acknowledge their relative lack of expertise or competence, and defer in some measure to
the party's judgment, this will not be the case in all situations. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in
Mrazek v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections,115 that "[tihe parties are
best situated to define the proper constituencies of their nominating
delegates, and these determinations should not be invalidated unless
such definitions are used to exclude or disadvantage discrete groups
or minorities." " 6 Thus, where the Court has reason to suspect that
a party's position vis-a-vis a state law is based on a discriminatory
intent, deference to the party ceases to be appropriate, and an outcome favorable to the state becomes likely. 117
On the one hand, when the matter is of general importance to all states-such as the
time and place of the national convention-the need for uniformity may be so great
that it overrides the potential interests of any one state. In matters of concern to
only one state, on the other hand, the preference for uniformity should not automatically render illegitimate the assertion of state interests.
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 250 (1981).
Professor Tribe concedes that the Cousins Court expressly limited its holding to state
laws affecting national party rights, but concludes that the holding would logically apply with
equal force to state parties-regardless of whether the party is state or national in character,
an intrusion upon associational freedoms is an intrusion as such. L. TRIBE, supra note 46, at
787. The balancing of interests test, however, does not accommodate the Court's concern
that, unlike state regulation of state parties, regulation of national parties may result in the
infliction of state policy on individuals who had no input in the formation of such policy. It
would thus be quite reasonable for the Court not to apply the full force of Cousins to laws
affecting state parties.
115.
Mrazek v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 630 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
116. Id. at 896 n.11. In support of this proposition, the court cited City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
117. This raises perplexing state action questions. If the indicia of state action inhere in
political party activity to a degree sufficient to require that the party not infringe upon rights
of due process and equal protection, one could argue that the party also is prohibited from
abridging first amendment freedoms. If so, the action taken by the Democratic Party in La
Follette might be unconstitutional, since the National Party in effect denied Wisconsin residents the opportunity to affiliate privately with the candidate of their choice. While the state
interest justifying voter affiliation requirements in Kusper and Rosario was to prevent voter
raiding, the National Party in La Folletteconceded that there was no evidence of voter raiding
in the Wisconsin primary. Consequently, the "state interest" of the National Party is arguably slim. In its briefs, the State Party did present a state action argument of this sort, but the
argument was not addressed in the decision. See supra note 29.
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Where the legislature has not overextended its reach, or where
the court has reason to suspect that the party's objections to a state
law are a product of prejudice rather than expert judgment, the
Court will be inclined to approve the state law. As the reach of state
laws regulating the electoral process extends to matters of national
concern, however, the Court will become increasingly reluctant to
rely on the state's assessment of what is necessary and proper, and
will place greater confidence in the competence of the party to decide
such matters. Similarly, where the Court perceives party decisions
as being motivated not by discrimination but by a healthy concern
for the party's well being, judicial deference to political party expertise is more probable.
CONCLUSION

The courts have traditionally resolved conflicts between the
state's regulatory interests, and the individual's or group's freedom
to associate, by a balancing process: A substantial intrusion upon
associational rights is unconstitutional absent a showing of compelling state interest, while an insubstantial intrusion need only be justified by a legitimate state interest to pass muster. The Supreme
Court employed the balancing test in La Follette: the Wisconsin statute requiring the National Party to accept delegates bound by open
primary outcomes effected a "substantial intrusion" upon the
Party's freedom to associate, was not supported by a compelling
state interest to the extent that the contested restriction impacted
upon national nominating procedures, and was therefore unconstitutional. Yet, given the Court's refusal to evaluate the nature and
extent to which the statute burdened the National Party's associational freedoms, and its failure to consider certain seemingly vital
aspects of the state's interest, the balancing test is of limited usefulness to understanding why the Court held as it did.
La Follette may be better understood in the context of a comparison of institutional decisionmakers. The Court is reluctant to immerse itself in national political party disputes which the Court has
neither the capacity nor competence to decide. The Court is likewise
hesitant to defer to the state legislature, which has the incentive and
expertise to protect the efficiency of the electoral process only on the
state, not the national level. The remaining alternative is for the
Court to defer to the judgment of the political party once the Court
is satisfied that an ascertainable burden on the party's freedom has
been demonstrated. By virtue of its expertise and experience, the
party is more competent than the courts to decide if a particular
state regulation unduly interferes with the nomination of a presiden-
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tial candidate. As a national organization with a vested interest in
pleasing a majority of voters across the country, it is better able
than the state legislatures to represent the nationwide interest in
preserving the efficiency of the candidate selection process. In this
light, the Court's predisposition to label as "substantial" any measurable interference with political party functioning, and its corresponding disinclination to classify the state's interest in perpetuating the interference as "compelling", is understandable.
Looking toward the future, one can anticipate that the Court
will continue to look with disfavor upon state statutes that interfere
to any ascertainable degree with the freedom of national political
parties to formulate national policy objectives and implement plans
designed to achieve those objectives. The same may not necessarily
be true, however, of statutes affecting exclusively state parties, state
residents, or state policy objectives. Further clarification of the
proper role of state legislatures and courts vis-a-vis political parties
must now await the disposition of cases that will inevitably arise out
of the elections of 1984 and 1988.
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